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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines the impact of self-managed working time (SMWT) on firm per-
formance using panel data from German establishments. As a policy for the decentralization of 
decision rights, SMWT provides employees with extensive control over scheduling individual 
working time. From a theoretical viewpoint, SMWT has ambiguous effects on both worker 
productivity and wages. Based on the construction of a quasi-natural experiment and the combi-
nation of a differences-in-differences approach with propensity score matching as an identifica-
tion strategy, the empirical analysis shows that up to five years after introduction, SMWT in-
creases firm productivity by about 9% and wage costs by about 8.5%. This implies that SMWT 
improves both individual and firm productivity, and supplemental evidence shows that these 
productivity enhancements can primarily be explained by incentive effects associated with decen-
tralization policies in general.  
 
 
JEL Classification: J24; J81; M50 
Keywords: Self-managed working time, job autonomy, firm performance, treatment effect, quasi-
natural experiment 
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1. Introduction 
The policy of delegating decision rights to subordinate workers is one of the most controversially 
discussed issues in personnel and organizational economics. On the one hand, it is argued that 
providing workers with autonomy over certain job dimensions may enhance individual and firm 
performance via improved worker motivation or the usage of superior knowledge at lower hierar-
chical levels. On the other hand, it is emphasized that promoting a worker’s job autonomy in-
volves a serious moral hazard problem as monitoring is made more difficult, so workers might 
behave opportunistically by abusing their authority at the expense of firm performance. As a re-
sult, decentralization policies typically create challenging dilemma situations for the delegating 
manager (Holmstrom 1984; Melumad et al. 1997). 
Self-managed working time (SMWT) is one of these policies of decentralization. Here, 
workers are endowed with extensive control over the duration, position, and distribution of their 
working hours (Kelly and Moen 2007; Nijp et al. 2012; Shockley and Allen 2012). This includes 
discretion over starting and finishing times, breaks, vacation days and days off. Under SMWT 
employees are also allowed to distribute their workdays over the working week autonomously. 
Sometimes SMWT workers can even decide where to work (e.g., in the workplace or at home).1 
At the firm-level, SMWT implies that employers do no longer need to register and control their 
employees’ working time. Today, about 15% of the employees in the United States and 17% of 
the employees working in one of the EU27 countries are free to set their working hours on their 
own responsibility (Golden 2012; Goudswaard et al. 2012). 
The literature on working time autonomy and flexibility provides two reasons for the intro-
duction of practices such as SMWT (Golden 2009; Ortega 2009; Bloom et al. 2011; Shockley 
and Allen 2012). First, firms might provide workers with SMWT in order to increase individual 
productivity. In this case, one should not only expect a positive impact on firm productivity but 
also on the wage bill, because increased worker productivity should be compensated via higher 
wages. Second, granting SMWT might be a firm’s response to a growing need of its employees 
to balance work and family obligations. In this case, firms are more likely to benefit from re-
duced wage costs than from increased productivity, unless SMWT allows firms to attract better 
workers. Individual productivity may even decline when workers opportunistically exploit the 
                                                 
1 There are alternative expressions for SMWT in the literature, e.g., work time control, schedule control, trust hours, 
trust-based working time or boundary-less work (Singe and Croucher 2003; Kelly and Moen 2007; Beckers et al. 
2012; Godart et al. 2014). 
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discretion over their working hours in the absence of working time registration by caring more 
about their personal lives than about organizational duties. Under these conditions, adopting 
SMWT can only be beneficial for firms if the workers concerned perceive SMWT as a fringe 
benefit and are thus willing to accept sufficient wage concessions in return.  
Apart from these explanations that apply to policies of working time autonomy and flexibil-
ity in general, firms may also find SMWT attractive for another, regime-specific reason. Since 
the concept of SMWT relieves the employer of the obligation to record working hours, overtime 
work is no longer defined. Consequently, the employees concerned are no longer compensated 
for working overtime. In this manner, SMWT might help firms to reduce their wage costs with-
out necessarily reducing actual extra work. Whether this proceeding can be profitable or not 
largely depends on the workers’ response to the elimination of paid overtime.  
All in all, therefore, the impact of SMWT on firm performance remains an open question 
and the net-effect is ex ante unclear. Hence, the objective of the present paper is to empirically 
investigate the actual impact of SMWT on firm performance. For this purpose, I use panel data 
from German establishments (the IAB Establishment Panel). Firm performance is measured by 
both firm productivity and the wage bill, which also allows conclusions to be drawn regarding 
firm profitability. In order to be able to identify causal effects rather than conditional correlations, 
I simulate a quasi-natural experiment by constructing a balanced panel and using survey infor-
mation from various periods before, during, and after intervention, where intervention is defined 
by the introduction of SMWT. The estimation strategy for identifying the treatment effects of 
interest is a differences-in-differences approach that is combined with propensity score matching 
to meet the key assumption of common trends between the treatment group and the control 
group.  
In order to incorporate a study on the performance effects of measures of working time au-
tonomy such as SMWT into the existing literature, one has to consider the broad range of flexible 
working time arrangements, which typically includes practices of working time autonomy. The 
impact of flexible working time policies on firm performance has often been investigated in the 
context of family-friendly workplace practices or work-life balance programs (e.g., Konrad and 
Mangel 2000; Perry-Smith and Blum 2000; Arthur 2003; Baughman et al. 2003; Bloom and Van 
Reenen 2006; Heywood et al. 2007; Giardini and Kabst 2008; Beauregard and Henry 2009; Ngo 
et al. 2009; Bloom et al. 2011; Leslie et al. 2012). However, none of these studies explicitly con-
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siders SMWT as a measure of these practices. Other studies focus on specific working time ar-
rangements that are related to SMWT, such as flextime or working from home, and predominant-
ly find positive effects on firm performance (e.g., Shepard et al. 1996; Lee and DeVoe 2012; 
Bloom et al. 2015).  
Studies that directly examine the consequences of SMWT (or work time control) are scarce. 
They are either interested in individual-level outcomes, such as job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, worker effort or health (e.g., Ala-Mursula et al. 2004, 2005; Moen et al. 2011a; 
Takahashi et al. 2011; Lyness et al. 2012; Kubo et al. 2013; Beckmann et al. 2015), or estimate 
the impact on firm-level outcomes other than financial performance, such as product innovations 
and turnover (e.g., Moen et al. 2011b; Godart et al. 2014). All these studies identify positive out-
comes for both employees and employers or at least no negative outcomes. To the best of my 
knowledge, there is so far no other study that empirically examines the impact of SMWT on firm 
performance measured as firm productivity and wage costs. 
A second contribution of the paper can be seen in the use of a large-scale establishment-
level panel data set. Previous studies have often relied on cross-sectional data, very small sample 
sizes, non-random or non-representative samples (e.g., industry-specific data, data from one or 
just a few selected firms). Results from these studies may, of course, be informative and mean-
ingful, especially when they are based on controlled experimental settings such as the seminal 
paper by Bloom et al. (2015), who conduct a randomized field experiment using panel data on 
Chinese call center employees. The great benefit of such studies is that an experimental set-up 
provides ideal conditions for identifying causal intervention effects. However, relying on specific 
experimental scenarios usually diminishes the transferability and representability of the results. In 
contrast, I conduct a representative analysis based on one of the most extensive establishment-
level panel data sets in Europe, the IAB Establishment Panel. In studies based on large-scale sur-
vey data, the identification of causal treatment effects is usually more demanding than in random-
ized experiments. Nevertheless, I aim at estimating causal performance effects of SMWT by 
combining a differences-in-differences approach with propensity score matching. This procedure 
provides a solid basis for deriving management implications with regard to the effective use of 
SMWT in firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description 
of the theoretical background. In Section 3, I describe the data, explain the key variables, and 
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provide some descriptive statistics. Subsequently, I introduce the econometric model and the es-
timation strategy in Section 4, followed by the presentation and discussion of the empirical re-
sults in Section 5. The robustness of the estimates is checked in Section 6. In Section 7, I discrim-
inate between various explanations for the obtained effect of SMWT on firm productivity. Final-
ly, Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
As already mentioned in the introduction, firms adopt policies of working time autonomy to in-
crease productivity and/or as a response to the growing demand for human resource management 
policies that help employees to improve the coordination of work and private life issues. This 
implies that it is ex ante unclear whether working time arrangements such as SMWT effectively 
increase or perhaps even harm firm productivity.2  
Why can SMWT be expected to increase firm productivity? The answer to this question is 
manifold. First, as a policy that provides employees with control over individual working hours, 
SMWT contributes to enriching an employee’s job via enhanced job autonomy. Job autonomy 
itself is an important channel of an individual’s self-motivation or work morale. As a conse-
quence, SMWT is likely to increase the employees’ self-motivation, which in turn increases indi-
vidual effort levels and productivity (Askenazy and Caroli 2010). This view is consistent with a 
number of theories, including the theory of decentralization (e.g., Bloom et al. 2010; Lazear and 
Gibbs 2015), the job characteristics model (Hackman and Oldham 1976, 1980), or self-
determination theory (Deci and Ryan 1985). 
A second argument builds on another general benefit of decentralizing decision rights, 
whereby decision-making takes place at the level where the employees have superior information 
(e.g., Melumad et al. 1997; Bloom et al. 2010; Lazear and Gibbs 2015). Under SMWT, workers 
are allowed to make use of their private information about how to allocate individual working 
hours most efficiently. For example, workers can arrange their working hours according to their 
individual circadian rhythms and are then likely to work more productively (Pierce and New-
strom 1980). This should also have a positive impact on firm productivity.  
A third explanation for a positive relationship between SMWT and employee effort can be 
derived from social exchange theory (Homans 1958; Blau 1964) or gift exchange theory (Akerlof 
                                                 
2 A theoretical model on the consequences of SMWT on worker effort can be found in Beckmann et al. (2015). 
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1982). According to these approaches, workers may feel obliged to reciprocate in a positive way 
to benefits granted by their employers. Employees interpret these benefits as signals of recogni-
tion for past performance or trust in their work morale, and thus respond by exerting additional 
effort. In the present context, reciprocating workers may exert extra effort in return for receiving 
decision rights over the choice of their working hours, thus improving firm productivity.  
Finally, productivity increases might also be the result of worker selection effects. For ex-
ample, in an influential study on the productivity effects of performance pay, Lazear (2000) has 
shown that improved worker productivity can be explained by both incentive and selection ef-
fects. In the present case, this implies that SMWT might contribute to raising firm productivity if 
able workers join firms with SMWT arrangements rather than firms without such arrangements.  
On the other hand, however, one may also question the efficacy of SMWT as an appropri-
ate policy for increasing worker productivity. The key argument in this context is that decentral-
izing decision rights in general involves a serious moral hazard problem (e.g., Lazear and Gibbs 
2015). In the present case, granting employees control over their working hours bears the risk that 
these employees might abuse their discretion and behave opportunistically by reducing their indi-
vidual effort when their working hours are no longer recorded. This is because eliminating work-
ing time registration usually makes employee monitoring much more difficult. As a result, under 
the regime of SMWT employees face fewer shirking costs and may therefore be less productive 
than workers who do not have this autonomy.3 For example, since SMWT enables employees to 
coordinate their work and family obligations, workers may be more concerned about their per-
sonal lives than about their organizational duties. In this case, SMWT is unlikely to affect 
productivity positively and may even have negative consequences at the firm level.4  
The implementation of SMWT may not only have an impact on individual and firm 
productivity, but may also affect the wages of the concerned workers, and thus, the firm’s wage 
costs. One line of argument highlights the increased costs associated with raising worker produc-
tivity by means of SMWT. If SMWT does in fact motivate workers to increase their level of ef-
fort and productivity, workers are likely to receive higher wages in recompense, which in turn 
                                                 
3 For this reason, employers may wish to control whether or not employees achieve fixed objectives (Moen et al. 
2011a, 2011b). In this case, input control (recording working hours) would be replaced by output control (recording 
goal achievement). 
4 In contrast to this perspective, Singe and Croucher (2003) as well as MacEachen et al. (2008) argue that due to an 
improvement in work-life balance, control over individual working hours enhances job satisfaction and work morale 
and can then be assumed to improve worker performance.  
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increases the firm’s wage bill. However, another line of argument supports the view of SMWT as 
a policy for wage reduction. For example, where working time is no longer recorded, firms can 
save on overtime premiums and thus reduce their wage bills. Another explanation for declining 
wages as a result of an SMWT policy rests on the well-known trade-off between wages and 
fringe benefits (e.g., Gariety and Shaffer 2001; Baughman et al. 2003; Heywood et al. 2007). In 
line with the theory of compensating wage differentials, SMWT employees may earn less than 
other workers, because they are willing to substitute wages for higher job autonomy via SMWT.  
As a result of these considerations, the net-effect of SMWT on a firm’s profitability de-
pends on the direction and the size of the observed productivity and wage bill effect. However, 
some of the possible combinations appear to be economically implausible and are thus unlikely to 
occur. For example, one can hardly imagine that SMWT increases firm productivity and decreas-
es wage costs at the same time. Even if firms were able to exploit the fringe benefit-wages trade-
off or avoid overtime premiums after the adoption of SMWT, they would nevertheless have to 
pay workers for improved productivity. This latter cost would, most likely, outweigh the former 
wage-cost reduction. By the same token, it is economically and intuitively not very plausible to 
assume that SMWT could increase wage costs and decrease firm productivity simultaneously.  
The most plausible combinations regarding the performance effects of SMWT are the fol-
lowing. First, if SMWT increases worker productivity, it is also likely to increase both firm 
productivity and wage costs. The resulting effect on firm profitability might be positive or not, 
depending on the difference between the productivity and the wage bill increase. This case is 
likely to occur if firms adopt SMWT to increase productivity. Second, the introduction of SMWT 
could reduce both wage costs and firm productivity. This case is not unlikely to occur if SMWT 
employees reduce their efforts in response to their firm’s elimination of overtime compensation. 
Nevertheless, SMWT turns out to be profitable if the reduction in wage costs is greater than the 
decline in productivity. Similarly, if employees perceive SMWT as a policy that contributes to 
satisfying a growing need for work-life-balance issues, the adoption of SMWT is unlikely to im-
prove individual and firm productivity. In spite of this, firms might benefit from introducing 
SMWT via the fringe benefits-wages trade-off.  
In sum, therefore, the theoretical discussion regarding the impact of SMWT on firm per-
formance is quite heterogeneous and less unambiguous. This calls for an empirical analysis to 
shed light on this issue. 
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3. Data, variables, and descriptive statistics 
In this study, I use establishment-level panel data of the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB). The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual survey of over 15,000 firms of all size classes 
and industries, which ranks it as being the most extensive establishment-level data set in Germa-
ny. The firms are selected from a parent sample of all German firms that employ at least one em-
ployee covered by social security. This parent sample can be considered as complete, because 
firms in Germany are required by law to report the number of employees they have who are cov-
ered by social security. The selection method is stratification with respect to ten categories of 
establishment size and 16 economic sectors. This is why an establishment’s probability of being 
selected increases with the number of staff that it employs. Hence, the IAB Establishment Panel 
is approximately proportional to the national level of employment and therefore representative 
for the German economy. A large set of questions are covered periodically, such as employment, 
wage bills, sales, investments, international trade, innovations, organizational change, worker 
representation, vocational and continuing training, as well as other firm characteristics. Most im-
portantly for the present study, the incidence of SMWT has been covered regularly in even-
numbered years since 2004.5  
In the questionnaires, the incidence of SMWT is captured by a binary variable that is com-
posed of the responses to the following question: Does your establishment make use of trust-
based work hours / self-managed working time (including the company’s elimination of record-
ing working hours)? The firm representatives could answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Figures 1 and 2 provide 
some descriptive information about the development of SMWT in German firms over time.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
The statistics in Figures 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate that SMWT has become more and 
more popular, irrespective of sector affiliation and firm size. However, banks and insurance com-
panies are especially likely to offer SMWT arrangements to their employees. More than 50% of 
the firms in this industry apply SMWT. The lowest incidence of SMWT can be observed in the 
construction sector, where less than 20% of the firms implemented an SMWT arrangement. Apart 
from the positive time trend, Figure 2 additionally demonstrates that the incidence of SMWT 
increases with establishment size.  
                                                 
5 For an introduction to the IAB Establishment Panel, see Fischer et al. (2009). 
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Figures 1 and 2 reveal another interesting pattern with regard to the incidence of SMWT 
among German firms over time. Specifically, there is large increase in the average incidence rates 
between 2004 and 2008, while the corresponding rates between 2008 and 2012 remain quite sta-
ble. More precisely, the overall incidence rate of SMWT in German firms increases from about 
16% in 2004 to 28% in 2008, while the corresponding increase between 2008 and 2012 is just 
slightly more than 1%.6 This implies that a significant number of firms adopted SMWT between 
2005 and 2008, which prompted me to simulate a natural experiment (in the absence of a working 
time reform) and to estimate an intervention effect of SMWT as a human resource management 
practice on firm performance, where the time between 2005 and 2008 is the intervention or 
treatment period.  
For this purpose, I use the data from the panel waves 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 
2010 and restrict the sample to firms that provide information in each of these years and which 
employ at least one employee covered by social security.7 Additionally, all firms in the sample 
share the fact that they did not implement SMWT in 2004, which is therefore the last pre-
treatment or pre-intervention period. Firms that implemented SMWT between 2005 and 2008 and 
retained this arrangement at least until 2010 constitute the treatment group (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 1), while 
establishments without SMWT arrangements between 2004 and 2010 serve as control group 
(𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 0). In addition to firms with an SMWT arrangement in 2004, I excluded firms that I 
call ‘status switchers’. Status switchers are firms exhibiting discontinuous SMWT patterns; i.e., 
these firms switch between periods with and without SMWT. Finally, I do not consider firms 
with an SMWT introduction after 2008, because the period between 2008 and 2010 is intended to 
represent the post-treatment or post-intervention period.8 Conditioned on a set of covariates, the 
                                                 
6 Other working time arrangements exhibit similar patterns. For example, the incidence of changing the working time 
duration and position of part-time workers increased from about 12% in 2004 to 30% in 2008, while there was virtu-
ally no subsequent increase until 2012. The patterns for SMWT and working time flexibility for part-time workers 
are interesting insofar as there was no reform on working time arrangements in Germany between 2005 and 2008 
that could explain the distinct growth in these working time arrangements. The beginning of the global economic and 
financial crisis in 2008 is a possible explanation for the observation that the incidence of SMWT did not continue 
increasing between 2008 and 2012. From this time onwards, firms were likely to be more cautious regarding the 
adoption of innovative management practices in general. Another explanation for the stagnant SMWT rates after 
2008 is that firms may have already tapped the full potential of SMWT and could identify no further employees 
whose jobs would permit extending working time autonomy. 
7 In every panel wave, the total sales measure refers to the previous period. Hence, I transferred the sales information 
of 2003 through 2011 to 2002 through 2010 to ensure that past productivity is not explained by the current use of 
SMWT.  
8 Furthermore, I excluded non-profit establishments and the public sector. I also excluded banks and insurance com-
panies, because their productivity and profitability measures are based on total assets rather than total sales.  
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data used in this study is a balanced panel consisting of 82 firms belonging to the treatment group 
and 623 firms belonging to the control group.  
Compared to an unbalanced panel, a balanced panel is typically achieved at the cost of a 
significant reduction in sample size. On the other hand, however, utilizing a balanced panel en-
sures that the sample consists of the same firms before, during and after the intervention. As a 
result, the empirical analysis is not subject to the risk of potential compositional bias. The time-
line for my quasi-natural experiment is as follows: The period from 2002 to 2004 represents the 
pre-intervention period. The intervention itself, i.e., the adoption of SMWT, takes place between 
2005 and 2008. Finally, the post-intervention period starts at the end of 2008 and finishes at the 
end of 2010.  
[Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here] 
Figures 3 and 4 display the time series of the natural logarithms of total sales and wage bills 
(both deflated by the GDP deflator) separated for the treatment and the control group. The figures 
indicate two interesting facts. First, on average, the firms of the treatment group have already 
been more productive and exhibited higher wage costs (unconditioned on covariates) before the 
intervention than the firms of the control group. In absolute terms, for example, the average 
productivity difference in 2002 is about 2.3 million euros, while the corresponding average wage-
bill difference is more than 512,000 euros. These differences indicate that the average SMWT 
adopter is substantially larger than the average non-SMWT firm. Second, starting in the first in-
tervention period 2005, both the unconditioned productivity and wage-bill increases of firms be-
longing to the treatment group appear to be somewhat steeper than the corresponding measures 
for the control group.9 Of course, the two findings are purely descriptive and do not provide any 
meaningful insights with regard to a causal impact of SMWT on firm performance. In order to be 
able to draw conclusions in terms of causal inference, it is necessary to apply regression analysis, 
thereby accounting for both observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity.  
 
                                                 
9 Apart from these findings, the figures clearly demonstrate the consequences of the global economic and financial 
crisis, which led to a sharp decline especially in the sales profile in 2009. However, since the economic climate re-
covered quite quickly after 2009 and the analysis only considers the post-treatment even-numbered years, this event 
will not affect the results of this study. 
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4. Econometric model and estimation strategy 
The econometric model that I use to estimate the impact of SMWT on firm performance is based 
on an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function. Firm performance is measured at first as 
firm productivity captured by the natural logarithm of GDP-deflated total sales (ln𝑌𝑌). The input 
factors capital, labor, and materials are proxied by the GDP-deflated total investments (ln𝐾𝐾), the 
number of employees (ln 𝐿𝐿), and the GDP-deflated amount of material inputs (ln𝑀𝑀), respective-
ly. The approach of using total sales as a productivity measure and regressing this measure on the 
three input factors of capital, labor, and materials can also be found, for example, in Bloom and 
Van Reenen (2006, 2007).  
In addition, I control for observable firm characteristics by using a set of control variables 
𝑋𝑋 that are quite common in estimating the performance effects of certain human resource man-
agement practices within a production function framework.10 Specifically, I control for the struc-
ture of the workforce (the proportion of skilled workers, female workers, part-time workers, 
fixed-term workers, temporary agency workers, freelancers, mini-jobbers,11 and apprentices), 
technological innovations (status of technological equipment, amount of expansion investments), 
worker representation (presence of collective wage bargaining and works councils), the degree of 
globalization (export share), the churning rate, wage incentives (dummy for payments above col-
lective wage bargaining level), the presence of overtime work, and other firm characteristics (for-
eign ownership, legal form of a company, legal and economic independence of a company). 
Moreover, I include dummy variables for sector affiliation and firm location.12 Following an ap-
proach proposed by Dearden et al. (2006), I analogously estimate a GDP-deflated wage-bill equa-
tion (ln𝑊𝑊) and a corresponding profitability equation, where firm profitability is proxied by ln(𝑌𝑌 𝑊𝑊⁄ ), using the same set of input factors and control variables as specified for the production 
function. 
Given that I had the opportunity to edit the data so as to construct a quasi-natural experi-
ment, the aim of the present study is the estimation of an average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) by applying a differences-in-differences (DID) estimation strategy. This procedure should 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Hirsch and Mueller (2012), who also use the IAB Establishment Panel to estimate the productivity ef-
fects of temporary agency work. 
11 Mini jobbers represent a widespread phenomenon of the German labor market. The term describes workers with a 
monthly gross wage of up to 400 euros (450 euros since 2012). 
12 The precise definitions and descriptive statistics of the complete set of variables used in this study are available 
from the author upon request.  
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allow me to capture the causal impact that SMWT has on firm performance when implemented as 
a human resource management practice. The estimation model can therefore be written as ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 ln𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛼𝛼3 ln𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽              +𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,   (1) 
where 𝑦𝑦 represents the respective measure of firm performance, i.e., total sales (𝑌𝑌), the wage bill 
(𝑊𝑊), or firm profitability (𝑌𝑌 𝑊𝑊⁄ ). The input factors 𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿, and 𝑀𝑀 are lagged by one period to avoid 
simultaneity problems. Furthermore, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an idiosyncratic error term, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 are time fixed effects 
captured by a series of annual time dummies to account for cyclical fluctuations, and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 reflects 
firm fixed effects. 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is a vector of pre-treatment time dummies. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖, where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable indicating the post-
intervention period, i.e., the period from the end of 2008 to the end of 2010. Hence, the parameter 
𝛾𝛾 captures the ATT, i.e., the performance effect of the introduction of SMWT between 2005 and 
2008. It corresponds to the DID estimator. 
The crucial identifying assumption for causal inference in a DID regression framework is 
the common trend or parallel paths assumption (e.g., Abadie 2005; Lechner 2010; Angrist and 
Pischke 2015). This assumption requires that prior to the adoption of SMWT the performance 
measures of firms in the treatment and control group evolve in a similar way. Consequently, the 
common trend assumption excludes pre-intervention anticipation effects (so-called Ashenfelter’s 
dip13) or different macro trends (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). Figures 3 and 4 provide first 
insights with respect to the validity or violation of the common trend assumption. It is evident 
that the time series of the treatment and the control group do not display a perfectly parallel evo-
lution between 2002 and 2004, which possibly indicates that the common trend assumption may 
indeed be violated. Recall, however, that Figures 3 and 4 display unconditioned performance 
values rather than the corresponding averages conditioned on a set of covariates, so a cautious 
interpretation of the finding appears to be appropriate at this stage. Fortunately, equation (1) al-
lows me to test the common trend assumption. The assumption cannot be rejected if the interac-
tion terms 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 turn out to be statistically insignificant, i.e., if 𝛿𝛿 = 0 (Mora and Reg-
gio 2012, 2014).  Equation (1) is estimated using the fixed effects within estimator. As a refer-
                                                 
13 It should be mentioned that Ashenfelter (1978) observed this phenomenon in the context of the evaluation of train-
ing programs, where he found that the wages of participants in training programs tend to fall just before entering the 
program. Transferred to the present case, this means that, if firm productivity or the wage bill declined in the periods 
before SMWT adoption, DID would be likely to overestimate the true treatment effect. 
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ence case, I also estimate equation (1) using conventional OLS, thereby ignoring the firm fixed 
effects 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and adding a time-invariant treatment variable 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 to the specification.  
In the case of a violation of the common trend assumption, combining the DID approach 
with propensity score matching (PSM) provides a potential solution (e.g., Blundell, Costa Dias, 
Meghir, and Van Reenen 2004; Abadie 2005; Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). The idea behind 
this strategy is to ensure that firms in both the treatment and the control group share the same or 
very similar pre-intervention characteristics.14 This can be achieved by matching firms of the 
treatment group with observationally similar firms of the control group before applying the DID 
estimator. Prior to the intervention, therefore, the treatment and the control group differ at best 
only with respect to treatment status. It appears quite intuitive that this procedure could help to 
satisfy the common trend assumption.  
 
5. Empirical results 
Table 1 displays the regression results based on equation (1).15  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Column (1) displays the DID estimates of the reference case applying the OLS estimator, while 
column (2) reflects the corresponding estimates of equation (1) applying the within estimator 
(FE). The ATT of SMWT on firm productivity in column (1) is 13.5%, while the corresponding 
ATT in column (2) is slightly lower at 11.5%.16 Both coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Analogously, I obtain significant wage effects of SMWT of 10.6% (column (1)) and 9.1% (col-
umn (2)), respectively. These results lead to the following preliminary conclusions. First, the in-
troduction of SMWT has a positive impact on firm productivity. Second, in combination with this 
outcome the positive wage effect of SMWT suggests that SMWT increases worker productivity 
which has to be compensated by higher wages. As a result, the net-effect of SMWT on firm prof-
itability is positive but relatively small and statistically insignificant (2.9% in column (1) and 
2.4% in column (2)).  
                                                 
14 An assumption underlying this idea is that a potential time-varying selection bias can be attributed to differences in 
initial observable firm characteristics. 
15 The estimates of the input factors and the control variables are available from the author upon request.  
16 In a semi-logarithmic model the estimated coefficients of dummy variables have to be technically adjusted accord-
ing to the transformation 𝛾𝛾′ = exp(𝛾𝛾) − 1. For simplicity and clearness, I abstain from this procedure during the 
course of the paper. The induced loss of precision should be acceptable, because in the present case the maximum 
deviation between 𝛾𝛾′ and 𝛾𝛾 is only about 1%.  
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The estimated productivity and wage effects of SMWT can only be interpreted as causal ef-
fects if the common trend assumption holds. This assumption can be tested by inclusion of the 
pre-treatment interaction terms 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 (which tests on parallel trends in 2003 and 2004) 
and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 (which tests on parallel trends in the first pre-intervention period 2002 and 
2004).17 While none of the coefficients for 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 is statistically significant from zero, 
this does not always hold for the coefficients of the interaction term 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2. This inter-
action term is statistically significant at the 10% level in the OLS DID wage function displayed in 
column (1). Furthermore, the size of the corresponding interaction term in the production func-
tion is relatively high, albeit insignificant, in the OLS DID specification (column (1)) as well as 
in the FE DID specification (column (2)). These results indicate that a violation of the common 
trend assumption cannot be ruled out, so one should be careful to interpret the estimated produc-
tivity and wage effects of SMWT in a causal manner.  
As mentioned in the previous section, combining the DID estimation strategy with PSM 
contributes to solving this problem. The combined PSM-DID approach proceeds in three steps. In 
a first step, the propensity score is estimated by specifying a binary choice model and regressing 
treatment status 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 on a set of pre-intervention characteristics that are supposed to determine 
selection into treatment status and/or to be responsible for a violation of the common trend as-
sumption. In a second step, matching quality is assessed by looking at the balancing properties of 
the pre-treatment covariates before and after matching. For this purpose, 𝑡𝑡-tests for equality of 
means in the treatment and control group samples before and after matching as well as compari-
sons of the standardized percentage biases before and after matching are applied. Finally, the 
third step is estimating equation (1) based on the matched sample and testing the common trend 
assumption.  
The PSM model in step 1 includes the following covariates.18 First, I consider the input fac-
tors 𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿, and 𝑀𝑀 of performance equation (1) as well as major covariates in 𝑋𝑋 that exhibited sub-
stantial differences between treatment and control firms in step 2 (i.e., differences were statisti-
cally significant or quite close to statistical significance). The considered 𝑋𝑋-variables are the 
shares of skilled workers, apprentices, and freelancers, the export share, the state of the technical 
equipment, the presence of a works council, and dummies for foreign ownership of the firm, its 
                                                 
17 The year 2004 represents the last pre-intervention period and therefore serves as reference group.  
18 The complete list of covariates of the PSM model is displayed in Table 2. The precise definitions and descriptive 
statistics of these variables are available from the author upon request. 
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legal form, its legal and economic independence, and service-sector affiliation. For example, 
since SMWT increases worker autonomy, it is more likely to be observed in firms with a relative-
ly high share of skilled workers and freelancers and with a relatively low share of apprentices. By 
the same token, SMWT should be more common in firms with high exports shares, state-of-the-
art technologies, and works councils that have codetermination rights in working time matters. 
Second, I add variables of working time flexibility (use of working time corridors, change of du-
ration and position of working time for part-time employees), practices of organizational decen-
tralization and change (dummies for the delegation of decision rights to lower hierarchical levels 
and the reorganization of departments and/or functions), and family-friendly workplace practices 
(incidence of offers for workers on parental leave to keep in touch with their job or firm) to the 
PSM equation. The intuition behind the inclusion of these variables is that measures of working 
time arrangements (other than SMWT), organizational decentralization and change, and work-life 
balance are unlikely to be equally distributed between the treatment and the control group. More 
precisely, firms are more likely to adopt a policy of worker autonomy such as SMWT if they also 
apply policies of working time flexibility, organizational decentralization and change, and fami-
ly-friendly workplace practices (e.g., Baughman et al. 2003; Heywood et al. 2007; Giardini and 
Kabst 2008; Bloom et al. 2011). Third, I add a dummy variable for realized product innovations, 
thereby addressing the finding of Godart et al. (2014), according to which SMWT is positively 
associated with product improvements. Finally, the PSM model includes pre-treatment total sales 
and wage bills, both in absolute logged terms and in differences.19 These variables are added to 
explicitly control for differences between treatment and control firms with regard to their pre-
intervention performance, so that treatment firms are matched to control firms with similar pre-
treatment performance levels and trends.20 
In order to avoid the possibility of time-varying control groups (i.e., control firms that are 
matched to one particular treatment firm vary across the pre-treatment periods), PSM is conduct-
ed using information only from the last pre-treatment period of 2004. It is important to conduct 
matching on pre-treatment characteristics that are themselves not affected by treatment status, 
                                                 
19 The differenced performance variables are calculated using two-period differences based on information from the 
pre-treatment periods 2004 and 2002.   
20 PSM helps to reduce the potential time-varying selection bias mentioned above, but is unlikely to completely elim-
inate it. The amount to which this selection bias can be reduced is largely determined by the quantity and quality of 
the covariates that are used to calculate the propensity score and conduct the matching (Becker and Ichino 2002). 
This is why the propensity score equation contains such a rich set of covariates. Using a large set of covariates in-
creases the likelihood that the matching procedure matches treated and untreated establishments that are virtually 
equal based on observable characteristics. 
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because this will help to meet the conditional independence assumption, which is another im-
portant assumption in the context of estimating treatment effects (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
The matching algorithm is the nearest neighbor matching with 10 nearest neighbors and replace-
ment.21 The weighted and unweighted DID estimates that are based on a matched sample can be 
found in columns (3) to (5) of Table 1,22 while the statistics providing information on matching 
quality are displayed in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 demonstrates that before matching, treated and untreated firms significantly differ 
regarding the mean values of the covariates in the PSM equation. This suggests that firms select-
ing into SMWT, in fact, differ systematically in various ways from firms not selecting into 
SMWT. After matching, however, the treatment and control group no longer differ significantly 
from each other in any of the considered firm characteristics and are thus comparable. Further-
more, none of the covariates exhibit a standardized percentage bias that appreciably exceeds ±5% and the ±8% level is never reached. All in all, these findings demonstrate that PSM leads to 
well-balanced distributions of the relevant covariates in the treatment and control group. Thus, 
they insistently confirm the high quality of the matching procedure.  
The inspection of the parameter estimates in the last three columns of Table 1 reveals two 
important results. First, both pre-treatment interaction terms 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 are statistically insignificant. This result holds for both the productivity and the wage equa-
tion. It does also hold in each of the OLS DID and FE DID specifications, irrespective of whether 
the observations in the matched sample are weighted or unweighted. In addition, compared to the 
corresponding estimates in the unmatched sample, the coefficients of the critical interaction term 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 decrease considerably. This also holds in each of the performance functions and 
model specifications. All in all, these results lead to the conclusion that the common trend as-
sumption can no longer be rejected. Second, compared to their counterparts displayed in columns 
(1) and (2), the treatment effects resulting from DID estimation on the matched sample are 
somewhat smaller. For example, the comparison of columns (2) and (5) reveals that the ATT of 
                                                 
21 I repeated the analysis using 15 and 20 nearest neighbors with replacement in the PSM procedure. The results are 
very similar to those presented and discussed in this paper.  
22 The matched DID estimates displayed in columns (3) and (5) are obtained using analytical weights, where higher 
weights are assigned to control firms with a close proximity (based on the propensity score) to the respective treat-
ment firm, while weights decline with increasing distance between treatment and control firm. The weight of treat-
ment firms is 1.  
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SMWT on firm productivity declines from 11.5% to 9.1%, while the corresponding ATT on the 
wage bill declines from 9.1% to 8.7%. In both cases, however, the treatment effects remain sig-
nificant at the 5% level.  
Since the common trend assumption cannot be rejected, the estimated treatment effects can 
be considered to be causal. Here, the preferred specification is the weighted FE DID model dis-
played in column (5). There are three reasons for this assessment. First, the treatment effects re-
sulting from column (5) are more conservative than their counterparts resulting from the OLS 
DID model displayed in column (3). Second, unlike the OLS estimator, the within estimator 
eliminates the bias caused by time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics for the complete set 
of covariates and not just for treatment status. Proceeding this way may additionally affect the 
size of the ATT of interest, as demonstrated in the present regression analyses. Third, the FE DID 
specification using analytical weights is preferred over the unweighted specification displayed in 
column (4), because the weighting procedure ensures that observations of control firms receive 
more weight when they are more similar to the characteristics of treatment firms. This contributes 
to increasing the degree of firm homogeneity within the matched sample relative to the approach 
without analytical weights.  
In sum, it can therefore be concluded that, on average, the introduction of SMWT increases 
firm productivity by about 9% up to five years after intervention. The corresponding average 
wage bill effect is also positive with a magnitude of about 8.5%. Both performance effects are 
economically as well as statistically significant and can be considered as causal. Since a large 
part of the productivity increase is obviously absorbed by the workers via higher wages, the aver-
age effect of SMWT on firm profitability is positive, but relatively small (about 0.5%) and insig-
nificant. Hence, SMWT is found to be beneficial for firms in terms of productivity, but not in 
terms of profitability.  
The finding of a positive productivity effect combined with a positive wage bill effect sug-
gests that SMWT does not only have the potential to satisfy a growing need for work-life balance 
issues, but also to increase worker productivity. Furthermore, this result contradicts the concern 
that SMWT, as a policy of worker autonomy, might encourage opportunistic effort reduction 
(shirking). In addition, the positive wage bill effect is not in line with the theory of compensating 
wage differentials which postulates a trade-off between SMWT as a fringe benefit and wages.  
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Besides the increasing worker productivity explanation, there is an alternative interpretation 
which posits that SMWT has a positive impact on wage bills. Specifically, a positive wage bill 
effect would also be expected if SMWT were associated with more compensated overtime work. 
This interpretation, however, is not really convincing, because SMWT exempts the employer 
from the obligation to record working hours. Consequently, overtime work is no longer defined, 
so paid overtime is unlikely to increase when a firm adopts SMWT. It is more likely that SMWT 
firms aim at substituting paid overtime for unpaid extra work in order to save on their wage costs. 
In supplemental regression analyses, however, I found no significant associations between 
SMWT and the amount of paid overtime as well as the probability of unpaid extra work (i.e., 
workers are neither compensated by overtime premiums nor by leisure time).23  
The findings of the present study are consistent with a number of related empirical studies 
that also examine the performance effects of policies of working time autonomy (i.e., SMWT, 
working from home, flextime). For example, using individual-level panel data and accounting for 
unobserved heterogeneity, Beckmann et al. (2015) find that SMWT has a positive impact on 
worker effort. Although large-scale individual-level data prevents the authors from constructing 
an unambiguous productivity measure, they can show that the increase in working hours caused 
by SMWT cannot be attributed to an inefficient usage of working time, so that increased working 
hours do actually reflect higher levels of worker effort. Furthermore, Godart et al. (2014), who 
also use data from the IAB Establishment Panel, find a positive association between the introduc-
tion of SMWT (called trust-based work-time) and the subsequent innovation performance of 
firms.  
The results of this paper are also in line with studies investigating the performance effects 
of working from home (e.g., Heywood et al. 2007; Bloom et al. 2015). Studies on working from 
home are closely related to the present paper, because working from home is often an integral 
part of an SMWT policy. While Bloom et al. (2015) exclusively focus on the policy of working 
from home in their randomized field experiment involving call center employees of a large Chi-
nese travel agency, Heywood et al. (2007) use linked employer-employee data and consider 
working from home as an integral part of a bundle of family-friendly workplace practices. 
                                                 
23 I conducted conventional fixed effects estimations, where the amount of paid overtime and the probability of un-
paid extra work were regressed on a lagged SMWT dummy, a series of other lagged working time arrangements, and 
the lagged covariates also used in the performance equations (1). In both cases, the coefficients of the lagged SMWT 
dummy are statistically insignificant. The regression results are available from the author upon request.  
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Among others, Bloom et al. (2015) find that working from home increases worker productivity 
by about 13%, which is in line with the 9% productivity increase ascribed to SMWT obtained in 
this paper. Finally, both Heywood et al. (2007), as well as Bloom et al. (2015) find a positive 
wage effect for working from home, which contradicts a fringe benefits-wage trade-off, but sup-
ports the view that employees working from home are compensated for increased productivity 
and is thus consistent with the respective finding in the present paper.  
Furthermore, the empirical results of this paper are in line with studies that focus on the 
performance effects of flextime, which is also a policy of working time autonomy, but the 
amount of autonomy is less than that for SMWT or working from home.24 For example, using 
panel data from a sample of slightly more than 30 companies of the pharmaceutical sector in the 
United States and applying random effects and two-stage least squares fixed effects estimates, 
Shepard et al. (1996) find that flextime contributes to increasing firm productivity by approxi-
mately 10%, which is comparable to the productivity effect of SMWT. Finally, using large-scale 
representative Canadian firm-level data and estimating (dynamic) fixed effects models, Lee and 
DeVoe (2012) find that flextime has a mixed impact on firm profitability, depending on whether 
the firms follow an employee-centered or a cost reduction strategy. Specifically, when flextime is 
implemented within a strategy centered on employees, both revenue and total payroll expendi-
tures are positively affected, where the revenue effect outweighs the wage cost effect, thus lead-
ing to higher profitability. However, when flextime is implemented within a cost reduction strat-
egy, the revenue effect is negative, while the wage cost effect is insignificant, so that profitability 
decreases. These findings fit with the results of the present study insofar as the overall effect on 
profitability is positive, but rather small.  
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
This section contains the results of a number of alternative specifications and estimation strate-
gies that aim at checking the robustness of the DID estimates discussed in the previous section. 
Specifically, five sensitivity checks are applied. First, DID is executed, but instead of combining 
DID with PSM, the treatment effect of SMWT is estimated by conditioning on lagged pre-
treatment covariates rather than contemporary pre- and post-treatment covariates as before. In 
this case, the estimation model has the following form:   
                                                 
24 Under flextime workers are restricted to work at certain core times and obliged to balance hours worked within a 
given time horizon.   
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ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖≤𝑖𝑖∗𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .     (2) 
Here, 𝑍𝑍 is the matrix of covariates including the input factors ln𝐾𝐾, ln 𝐿𝐿, ln𝑀𝑀, and the control 
variables specified in 𝑋𝑋.25 The index 𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑡∗ indicates the pre-treatment periods 2002, 2003, and 
2004, where 𝑡𝑡∗ represents the last pre-treatment period 2004.26 Conditioning on pre-treatment 
covariates may be viewed as an alternative approach to matching based on pre-treatment charac-
teristics and should therefore produce similar treatment effects to those reported in Table 1, col-
umns (4) and (5).   
Second, I repeat the estimation of equation (1), but instead of using ln 𝑦𝑦, I choose ln(𝑦𝑦 𝐿𝐿⁄ ) 
as the dependent variable, thereby considering the impact of SMWT on labor productivity and 
wage costs per employee rather than in absolute terms. Modifying the production and/or wage 
bill function in this way has also been applied in a number of empirical studies, including Addi-
son et al. (2001), Bertschek and Kaiser (2004), Bloom et al. (2011), and Bellmann and Hübler 
(2015). The estimation model therefore is27 ln �𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝛼𝛼1 ln𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + (𝛼𝛼2 − 1) ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3 ln𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽              +𝛾𝛾𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .   (3) 
As before, the DID estimator of 𝛾𝛾 can be viewed as a causal treatment effect if 𝛿𝛿 = 0.  
The third robustness check is an estimation of the differenced regression model 
Δ ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + Δ𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,        (4) 
where Δ denotes the difference operator that refers to the last post-treatment period 2010 and the 
last pre-treatment period 2004, i.e., Δ𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−6. Using differenced variables is an alterna-
tive procedure to account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 is equivalent to 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 insofar as it indicates firms that have introduced SMWT between 2005 and 2008. The 
only difference between 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is that 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 requires continuous participation of 
                                                 
25 The composition of 𝑍𝑍 slightly differs between the following specifications depending on the considered observa-
tion period and the availability of variables within this period. For more details, see the explanations in the note at 
the bottom of Table 3. 
26 Hence, the regression includes the panel waves of 2004, 2008, and 2010, where the variables in 𝑍𝑍 are transferred 
from 2002 to 2004, from 2003 to 2008, and from 2004 to 2010.  
27 Note that in equation (3) the term ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  replaces the original term ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 used in equation (1). Without this 
change, equations (3) and (1) would be equivalent, both yielding identical parameter estimates, except for ln 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1. 
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the firms merely in 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 (instead of 2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 
2010).  
A natural consequence of estimating the performance impact of the introduction of SMWT 
by means of a quasi-natural experimental setting as applied in this paper is the exclusion of firms 
that have already implemented SMWT in 2004 and before (first movers) as well as firms that 
have abolished their initial SMWT arrangements at some time after 2004 (abolishers). Moreover, 
this approach excludes status switchers as well as all firms with gaps in their survey participation 
between 2002 and 2010. Hence, the procedure of a quasi-natural experiment entails a substantial 
reduction in sample size. My fourth robustness check takes this point into account by specifying a 
conventional fixed effects model  ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .       (5) 
Here, 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 is a dummy variable indicating whether or not firm 𝑖𝑖 uses SMWT in period 𝑡𝑡. This 
specification keeps SMWT abolishers, first movers, and status switchers in the analysis. Fur-
thermore, the fixed effects model does not require a balanced panel and thus utilizes all available 
information of the firms, even if they do not participate in the survey over the entire observation 
period. 
As a final robustness check, I estimate a performance model that captures all possible ad-
justment strategies regarding SMWT, i.e., no adjustment (the SMWT status 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 = 1 or 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 = 0 in 2010 is the same as in the initial observation period 2004), the introduction of 
SMWT until 2008, and the abolishment of SMWT until 2008. In order to account for time-
constant unobserved heterogeneity, I consider a six-period differences model. The regression 
model can therefore be written as 
Δ ln 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + Δ𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + Δ𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ,    (6) 
where Δ and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 are defined as before. 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 is a dummy variable indicating first movers, i.e., 
firms that already established SMWT in 2004 and continued to apply SMWT at least until 2010, 
while 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 indicates firms that abolished their initial SMWT arrangement between 2005 
and 2008. Firms without an SMWT arrangement between 2004 and 2010 serve as the reference 
group.  
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The regression results of the five robustness checks can be found in Table 3.28  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Column (1) displays the treatment effects resulting from the DID estimation of equation (2). It 
turns out that both the productivity effect and the wage effect of SMWT are about 1.5 percentage 
points larger than in the benchmark model displayed in Table 1, column (5). Column (2) contains 
the DID estimates of 𝛾𝛾 that are obtained from equation (3), when the performance measure ln 𝑦𝑦 is 
replaced by ln(𝑦𝑦 𝐿𝐿⁄ ). In this specification, the ATT on labor productivity is about 1.5 percentage 
points smaller than the corresponding effect obtained in the benchmark model, but remains statis-
tically significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the ATT on wage costs per employee decreases to 
about 2.5%, which is statistically insignificant. Note that since both pre-treatment effects 𝛿𝛿1 and 
𝛿𝛿2 are not statistically significant from zero (labor productivity equation: 𝛿𝛿1 = 0.029,𝑝𝑝 =0.538, 𝛿𝛿2 = 0.034, 𝑝𝑝 = 0.539; wage per employee equation: 𝛿𝛿1 = −0.012,𝑝𝑝 = 0.706, 𝛿𝛿2 =
−0.013,𝑝𝑝 = 0.692), the common trend assumption cannot be rejected. Hence, unlike the 
benchmark model, causal inference in this case does not require the combination of DID with 
PSM. The SMWT effects resulting from the estimation of equation (4) are again similar to the 
benchmark effects (see column (3)). Furthermore, the estimates of the fixed effects model (5) 
displayed in column (4) indicate positive and significant productivity and wage effects of SMWT 
of approximately 1.5% and 1.3%, respectively.  
There are two explanations for the finding that the sizes of the performance effects obtained 
from the fixed effects model (5) are smaller than in the PSM-DID benchmark case. First, the 
benchmark model and the fixed effects model refer to different time horizons. While the treat-
ment effects in the benchmark model measure the average performance effect from 2008 to 2010 
relative to 2004, the fixed effects estimates capture the average biannual performance effect be-
tween 2004 and 2010. Second, the PSM-DID benchmark model focusses on performance effects 
of the introduction of SMWT, while the fixed effects model provides information about the per-
formance of firms that have established SMWT at some time between 2004 and 2010 relative to 
firms without an SMWT arrangement. In the latter approach, therefore, the performance effect of 
SMWT is identified using information of SMWT adopters, abolishers, and status switchers. For 
                                                 
28 Table 3 only contains the estimates for the productivity and the wage equations, as the estimates for the respective 
profitability functions are not displayed to save space. All estimated profitability effects of SMWT are quite small 
and insignificant. The corresponding regression results are available from the author upon request.  
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example, the fixed effects estimates would turn out to be smaller than the corresponding ATT if 
status switchers achieved smaller performance effects of SMWT than adopters.  
Finally, the results of the robustness check according to equation (6) can be found in col-
umn (5) of Table 3. The estimates confirm the previous impression from the fixed effects model. 
Most importantly, the introduction of SMWT as measured by 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 significantly increases both 
firm productivity and the wage bill, where the magnitudes of the coefficients are similar to the 
preceding findings. Interestingly, the corresponding coefficients for the firms that already imple-
mented SMWT before 2004 are positive, but fail to be statistically significant. There are at least 
two explanations for this finding. First, the positive performance effect of SMWT might decrease 
over time. Second, there might be a late adopter or second mover advantage rather than a first 
mover advantage with regard to the implementation of SMWT, meaning that firms which imple-
mented SMWT relatively early (in 2004 or before) did not achieve the same level of implementa-
tion quality as the firms which adopted SMWT later on. However, a precise answer as to which 
of the two explanations holds true is beyond the scope of this paper. Last but not least, the nega-
tive wage effect for firms that have abolished SMWT might at first sight be seen as good news, 
unless firm productivity also declines. The observed productivity loss is, in fact, negative, but 
insignificant. Altogether, this leads to a positive profitability effect of about 5.6% (not displayed), 
which is however statistically insignificant.  
 
7. Explanations for the productivity effect of SMWT 
The empirical analysis in Sections 5 and 6 has shown that the introduction of SMWT contributes 
to increasing firm productivity. The theoretical considerations in Section 2 offer four explana-
tions for this finding: (a) improved worker motivation via enhanced working time autonomy, (b) 
more efficient working time allocation due to decentralized decision-making, (c) increased work-
er effort elicited by the feeling to reciprocate positively to the endowment with SMWT, (d) posi-
tive selection effects that may occur if SMWT firms are able to attract more productive workers. 
This section aims at discriminating between the four channels of increased firm productivity.  
In their study on the impact of SMWT on worker effort, Beckmann et al. (2015) find that 
SMWT and intrinsic worker motivation are complements in exerting extra effort, while this does 
not hold for SMWT and worker reciprocity. Hence, intrinsically motivated workers are found to 
exert significantly more effort under an SMWT regime than less motivated workers, which is 
24 
 
 
consistent with the increased worker motivation interpretation mentioned above. However, there 
is no evidence that workers with a high level of positive reciprocity exert more effort under 
SMWT than workers with less reciprocity. Against this background, worker reciprocity as a re-
sponse to the firm’s ‘gift’ of SMWT does not appear to be a significant driver of firm productivi-
ty. Hence, although I cannot explicitly rule out the reciprocity interpretation with the results of 
this study which is based on firm-level data, positive worker reciprocity is unlikely to be respon-
sible for the productivity increase caused by SMWT.  
In contrast to the worker reciprocity interpretation, the data set used in this study allows me 
to estimate the relevance of selection effects (at least to some extent) by disentangling the incen-
tive and selection effects of SMWT. For this purpose, I proceed in two steps. First, I estimate 
whether the use of SMWT is associated with the hiring of skilled and high-skilled workers cap-
tured by the variable 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾, which is defined as the number of skilled and high-skilled workers 
hired within the first term of a respective year relative to all hiring decisions within this period (as 
a percentage). Second, I examine whether the hiring of skilled and high-skilled workers mediates 
or moderates the use of SMWT in a firm’s production function.  
In the first step, therefore, I estimate the labor demand equation 
𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,      (7) 
where again 𝑍𝑍 is the matrix of covariates. If 𝛾𝛾 > 0, SMWT is found to be associated with the 
hiring of skilled and high-skilled workers, thus indicating that SMWT contributes to attracting 
productive workers. Since 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 is censored at zero, equation (7) is estimated using Tobit maxi-
mum likelihood (ML), thereby ignoring the firm fixed effects 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖, and the fixed effects within es-
timator.29 
The second step is related to an estimation approach used in Lazear (2000) by specifying 
the production function  ln𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .  (8) 
As before, SMWT is expected to increase firm productivity, i.e., 𝛾𝛾1 > 0. In order to see whether 
or not 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 mediates the productivity effect of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇, one has to compare the estimate of 𝛾𝛾1 
when both 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 and the interaction term are excluded (i.e., 𝛾𝛾2 = 𝛾𝛾3 = 0) with the corresponding 
                                                 
29 The conventional fixed effects within estimator is used, since the fixed effects Tobit model leads to inconsistent 
parameter estimates (e.g., Baltagi 2008). 
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estimate of 𝛾𝛾1 when excluding only the interaction term (i.e., 𝛾𝛾3 = 0). If the latter is smaller than 
the former and 𝛾𝛾2 > 0, the overall productivity effect of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 is composed of both an incentive 
effect and a selection effect. Finally, the parameter 𝛾𝛾3 indicates whether or not 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 moderates 
the productivity effect of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇. Equation (8) is estimated using the fixed effects within estima-
tor.30 
The estimation results of equations (7) and (8) are displayed in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The parameter estimates displayed in columns (1) and (2) indicate that the use of SMWT contrib-
utes to increasing the share of hired skilled and high-skilled workers, which leads to the conclu-
sion that firms can adopt SMWT as a recruiting device. Furthermore, the estimates of the aug-
mented production function (8) displayed in column (5) show that the hiring of qualified employ-
ees does not moderate the productivity effect of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 as the hypothesis 𝛾𝛾3 = 0 cannot be re-
jected. Finally, hiring qualified workers mediates the productivity effect of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 only to a very 
small extent. The coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 decreases only slightly from 𝛾𝛾1 = 3.9% in column (3) to 
𝛾𝛾1 = 3.7% in column (4).31 According to these estimates, the overall productivity effect of 
SMWT appears to be mainly driven by an incentive effect, while selection effects obviously only 
play a minor role. All in all, therefore, the findings obtained in this section suggest that the posi-
tive productivity effect of SMWT can be attributed to the benefits of decentralized decision-
making, i.e., improved worker motivation and more efficient working time allocation due to uti-
lizing superior knowledge at lower hierarchical levels.  
 
8. Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, I empirically examine the impact of SMWT on firm performance using German 
establishment-level panel data. The implementation of SMWT provides employees with a high 
degree of control over scheduling individual working time. Theoretically, workers may respond 
positively or negatively to their newly gained time sovereignty, depending on whether the pro-
ductive incentives of time sovereignty outweigh the counterproductive incentives or not.  
                                                 
30 The variable 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 is only available in the data from 2008 onwards. Hence, equation (8) is estimated using the 
panel waves of 2008 and 2010. This is different to the estimation of equation (5), where the panel waves of 2004, 
2006, 2008, and 2010 can be applied.  
31 Note that the coefficient for 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 is about 2.5 times larger than the corresponding estimate displayed in Table 3, 
column (4). This is in line with the previous finding obtained in Section 6, according to which the productivity effect 
of SMWT might diminish over time.  
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Based on the construction of a quasi-natural experiment and an estimation strategy that 
combines differences-in-differences estimation with propensity score matching, I find that both 
firm productivity and the wage bill increase after the adoption of SMWT. Up to five years after 
the introduction of SMWT, the estimated productivity effect of SMWT is approximately 9%, 
while the corresponding wage effect is approximately 8.5%, leaving an economically small and 
statistically insignificant effect on firm profitability. Since the estimation approach ensures the 
validity of the common trend assumption, the estimated productivity and wage effects of SMWT 
can be interpreted as causal effects. The parameter estimates are robust to several modifications 
with regard to sample size, model specification, and estimation technique. 
The main conclusion from these results is that the introduction of SMWT has a positive 
impact on worker productivity, which has to be compensated by higher wages. At the firm level, 
improved worker productivity becomes visible in the form of increased sales. All in all, therefore, 
the finding of a positive productivity effect in combination with a positive wage bill effect argues 
for the view that firms adopt SMWT primarily in order to increase worker productivity rather 
than solely as a response to a growing demand for work-life balance policies. This view is con-
sistent with related studies that also find positive performance effects as a result of working time 
autonomy (e.g., Heywood et al. 2007; Beckmann et al. 2015; Bloom et al. 2015). Moreover, the 
results contradict concerns that are common to decentralization policies in general, i.e., that the 
delegation of decision rights to subordinates encourages opportunistic behavior (here: effort re-
duction). In fact, the results of the study emphasize the importance of the benefits of decentraliza-
tion policies. According to the theory of decentralization, increased work motivation and an ef-
fective utilization of the specialized competence of subordinate staff are the key drivers of im-
proved worker productivity. This perspective is supported by supplemental empirical evidence 
suggesting that firm productivity is more likely to be explained by incentive effects than by selec-
tion effects or worker reciprocity.  
Interestingly, the positive wage effect of SMWT clearly contradicts the concerns of those 
who suspect that the introduction of SMWT might first and foremost serve as a policy for saving 
wage costs by revoking the mandatory registration of working time and thereby eliminating paid 
overtime work. If reducing wage costs was really the motivation behind the firm’s introduction of 
SMWT, one would expect to find a negative wage bill effect. And even if repealing paid over-
time work did not impair the improved worker motivation induced by SMWT, it would still be 
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unlikely for the overall wage bill effect to be significantly positive. Hence, it can at least be con-
cluded that any potential wage cost saving effect is clearly outweighed by wage bill increases 
caused by improved worker productivity. 
The results of the present study provide some important management implications for firms 
which are considering the introduction of SMWT arrangements. Most importantly, SMWT im-
proves firm productivity and is therefore beneficial for firms. It is also beneficial for workers 
because of its positive effect on wages. The attractiveness of SMWT for workers is additionally 
emphasized in those studies which find that SMWT, or general job autonomy, is positively asso-
ciated with job satisfaction when using large-scale individual-level data (e.g., Green 2004; Holly 
and Mohnen 2012). SMWT therefore appears to be a valuable human resource management prac-
tice, so firms can be encouraged to adopt SMWT arrangements. Even if one accepts that a sub-
stantial part of increased firm productivity is absorbed by the workers via higher wages, SMWT 
implementation might nevertheless be an interesting firm strategy. The first reason for this is that 
the implementation of SMWT might contribute to reducing a firm’s monitoring costs. For exam-
ple, the elimination of recorded working time which is associated with the introduction of SMWT 
is a promising means for reducing monitoring costs. Furthermore, as a family-friendly workplace 
practice, SMWT might contribute to mitigating worker turnover, thereby reducing turnover costs. 
Finally, the analysis in Section 7 has shown that SMWT has the potential to improve the employ-
ers’ attractiveness for skilled and high-skilled workers.  
Nevertheless, firms should keep an eye on the sustainability of the productivity improve-
ments. According to a finding in the sensitivity analysis, it cannot be ruled out that the positive 
productivity effect of SMWT declines over time, and thus, fails to be persistent. In this context, it 
might be helpful to think about modifying the initial SMWT arrangement. For example, one 
might consider extending the degree of worker autonomy by additionally allowing SMWT em-
ployees to work from home. This response appears to be more promising than the prospect of 
abolishing SMWT, as the results in this paper indicate. 
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Figure 1. Incidence of SMWT by sector affiliation 
Note: The displayed values are percentages. Sample size in 2004/2008/2012 is 15,588/15,380/15,325. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2004, 2008, 2012, own calculations.  
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Figure 2. Incidence of SMWT by establishment size (number of employees) 
Note: The displayed values are percentages. Sample size in 2004/2008/2012 is 15,588/15,380/15,325. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2004, 2008, 2012, own calculations. 
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Figure 3. Total sales (logged, GDP-deflated) in SMWT and non-SMWT establishments 
Note: Sample size: 82 (SMWT establishments), 623 (non-SMWT establishments). 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations.  
 
Figure 4. Wage bills (logged, GDP-deflated) in SMWT and non-SMWT establishments 
Note: Sample size: 82 (SMWT establishments), 623 (non-SMWT establishments).  
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations.   
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Table 1. The impact of SMWT on firm performance 
Estimation strategy OLS DID FE DID OLS DID 
(weighted) 
FE DID  
(unweighted) 
FE DID 
(weighted) 
Dependent 
variable 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ln𝑌𝑌 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.121** 
(0.057) 
 -0.131** 
(0.065) 
  
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 0.135** 
(0.059) 
0.115**  
(0.046) 
0.130** 
(0.065) 
0.108** 
(0.045) 
0.091** 
(0.046) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 0.055    
(0.056) 
0.052    
(0.052) 
0.056    
(0.061) 
0.054    
(0.053) 
0.047    
(0.056) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 0.106   
(0.072) 
0.081    
(0.061) 
0.048    
(0.076) 
0.064    
(0.060) 
0.044    
(0.061) ln𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.103** 
(0.041) 
 -0.088** 
(0.042) 
  
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 0.106** 
(0.053) 
0.091**  
(0.045) 
0.097*    
(0.051) 
0.083*    
(0.044) 
0.087** 
(0.042) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 0.029    
(0.048) 
0.029    
(0.042) 
0.012    
(0.050) 
0.015    
(0.042) 
0.003    
(0.043) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 0.084* 
(0.047) 
0.067    
(0.046) 
0.035    
(0.050) 
0.048    
(0.046) 
0.019   
(0.045) ln(𝑌𝑌 𝑊𝑊⁄ ) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 -0.018   
(0.052) 
 -0.043    
(0.057) 
  
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 0.029    
(0.055) 
0.024     
(0.043) 
0.033    
(0.060) 
0.025    
(0.043) 
0.004    
(0.043) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 0.026     
(0.060) 
0.023    
(0.054) 
0.044    
(0.064) 
0.039    
(0.057) 
0.044     
(0.059) 
 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 0.022    
(0.071) 
0.014   
(0.065) 
0.013    
(0.074) 
0.016    
(0.065) 
0.025    
(0.066) 
 Input / control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
𝑛𝑛  705 705 425 425 425 
𝐼𝐼  3,525 3,525 2,125 2,125 2,125 
Note: The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 𝐼𝐼 (𝑛𝑛) is the number of 
observations (firms). All specifications additionally contain an identical set of covariates described in Section 4. The 
estimates displayed in columns (3)–(5) are based on a matched sample using propensity score matching. The match-
ing algorithm is nearest neighbor matching with 10 neighbors and replacement. In columns (3) and (5) the observa-
tions of the control group (non-SMWT firms) are weighted using analytical weights. * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; *** 
𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2011; own calculations.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by treatment status before and after matching 
 Before matching After matching 
Covariate Treatment group 
Control 
group 𝑝𝑝 > |𝑡𝑡| %bias Treatment group Control group 𝑝𝑝 > |𝑡𝑡| %bias ln𝐾𝐾 8.881 7.209   0.014** 28.5 8.881 8.905 0.967 -0.4 ln 𝐿𝐿 3.680 3.041   0.000*** 38.0 3.680 3.672 0.966 0.4 ln𝑀𝑀 14.414 13.518   0.000*** 38.5 14.414 14.409 0.986 0.2 
Skilled workers 72.855 66.824   0.031** 26.8 72.855 72.229 0.774 2.8 
Apprentices 3.765 5.836   0.045** -26.5 3.765 3.836 0.906 -0.9 
Freelancers 2.024 0.660   0.312 12.5 2.024 2.314 0.874 -2.6 
Technical status 0.743 0.663   0.145 17.6 0.743 0.750 0.885 -1.3 
Exports 9.817 3.640   0.000*** 41.5 9.817 8.795 0.555 6.9 
Works council 0.414 0.197   0.000*** 48.3 0.414 0.426 0.800 -2.7 
Foreign ownership 0.109 0.037   0.003*** 27.9 0.109 0.125 0.613 -6.1 
Private company 0.268 0.412   0.012** -30.7 0.268 0.292 0.577 -5.2 
Independent company 0.768 0.889   0.002*** -32.6 0.768 0.785 0.673 -4.6 
Working time changes for 
part-timers 
0.158 0.056   0.001*** 33.2 0.158 0.160 0.945 -0.8 
Working time corridors 0.182 0.089   0.008*** 27.5 0.182 0.202 0.611 -5.7 
Delegation of decision rights 
to lower hierarchical levels 
0.158 0.085   0.034** 22.3 0.158 0.175 0.638 -5.2 
Reorganization of depart-
ments and/or functions  
0.317 0.113   0.000*** 51.0 0.317 0.301 0.724 4.0 
Parental leave offer 0.170 0.090   0.023** 23.8 0.170 0.173 0.947 -0.7 
Product innovations 0.548 0.331   0.000*** 44.6 0.548 0.539 0.840 2.0 
Service sector 0.414 0.328   0.122 17.8 0.414 0.448 0.478 -7.1 ln𝑌𝑌 15.199 14.317   0.000*** 41.8 15.199 15.231 0.881 -1.5 
Δ ln𝑌𝑌 -0.057 -0.002   0.174 -12.9 -0.057 -0.024 0.434 -7.9 ln𝑊𝑊 13.605 12.805   0.000*** 39.0 13.605 13.604 0.996 0.1 
Δ ln𝑊𝑊 -0.092 -0.029   0.193 -14.5 -0.092 -0.065 0.504 -6.2 
𝑛𝑛 82 618   82 343   
Note: 𝑛𝑛 is the number of firms. %bias denotes the standardized percentage bias. The propensity score matching algo-
rithm is nearest neighbor matching with 10 neighbors and replacement. The pre-treatment period is 2004. The obser-
vations of the control group (non-SMWT firms) in the matched sample are weighted using analytical weights. 
* 𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; *** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2011; own calculations. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity analysis 
Estimation strategy FE DID FE DID OLS FE OLS 
Model specification (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Regres-
sand 
Explanatory 
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ln𝑌𝑌 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 0.108***  
(0.040) 
    
ln(𝑌𝑌 𝐿𝐿⁄ ) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  0.076**  
(0.037) 
   
Δ ln𝑌𝑌 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃   0.098**  
(0.046) 
  
ln𝑌𝑌 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇    0.015**  
(0.007) 
 
Δ ln𝑌𝑌 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀     0.028     
(0.041) 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃     0.102** 
(0.047) 
 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴     -0.044     
(0.045) ln𝑊𝑊 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 0.100**  
(0.047) 
    
ln(𝑊𝑊 𝐿𝐿⁄ ) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇  0.024      
(0.030) 
   
Δ ln𝑊𝑊 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃   0.073*      
(0.044) 
  
ln𝑊𝑊 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇    0.013*    
(0.007) 
 
Δ ln𝑊𝑊 𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀     0.071     
(0.047) 
 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃     0.077*      
(0.045) 
 𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴     -0.100**   
(0.049) 
𝑛𝑛  705 705 1,156 13,129 1,313 
𝐼𝐼  2,115 3,525 1,156 25,786 1,313 
Note: The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors clustered at the firm level (columns (1), (2), (4)) or 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (columns (3), (5)). 𝐼𝐼 (𝑛𝑛) is the number of observations (firms). The specifi-
cations contain the same covariates that have also been applied in the regressions displayed in Table 1. The model 
displayed in column (1) additionally controls for the pre-treatment variables Δ ln𝑌𝑌 and Δ ln𝑊𝑊. The pre-treatment 
interaction terms 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇1 and 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 × 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 are not displayed in column (2). They are always insignifi-
cant, so the hypothesis 𝛿𝛿 = 0 cannot be rejected. The models in columns (3), (4) and (5) additionally control for a 
series of working time arrangements (work at weekends, working time changes for part-timers, working time ac-
counts, employment-securing working time reduction) and include a product innovation dummy (except the FE 
model in column (4)). * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05; *** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2002-2011; own calculations.  
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Table 4. Incentive and selection effects of SMWT  
Estimation strategy Tobit ML FE FE FE FE 
Model specification (7) (7) (8) (8) (8) 
Dependent variable 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 ln𝑌𝑌 ln𝑌𝑌 ln𝑌𝑌 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 4.256***       
(1.309) 
2.425**  
(0.980) 
0.039*** 
(0.012) 
0.037*** 
(0.012) 
0.039*** 
(0.014) 
𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾    0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.041*** 
(0.012) 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑊𝑊𝑇𝑇 × 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾     -0.005     
(0.021) 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
𝑛𝑛  14,010 14,010 8,650 8,650 8,650 
𝐼𝐼  23,709 23,709 12,229 12,229 12,229 
Note: The values in parentheses represent robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 𝐼𝐼 (𝑛𝑛) is the number of 
observations (firms). The parameter estimates for 𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾 and the interaction term are multiplied by 100. The specifi-
cations contain the same set of covariates that has also been applied in column (4) of Table 3. * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.1; ** 𝑝𝑝 <0.05; *** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, waves 2008-2012; own calculations. 
 
